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A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO ATTACKING 
MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION: THE 
LACK OF JUDICIAL RELIEF 
MICHAEL S. LITTLE* 
The size and arrangements of a people's homes are no unfair index 
of their condition. If, then, we inquire more carefully into these 
Negro homes, we find much that is unsatisfactory. All over the face 
of the land is the one-room cabin-now standing in the shadow of 
the Big House, now staring at the dusty road, now rising dark 
and sombre amid the green of the cotton-Jields. It is nearly always 
old and bare, built of rough boards, and neither plastered nor 
ceiled . ... 
W.E.B. DuBois! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important and significant decisions a person can 
make in his or her life involves the purchase of a home. A home or 
household is not merely a dwelling structure; it is the foundation from 
which families are developed, neighborhood friendships are nurtured, 
and communities are born. However, for many minorities, home own-
ership is never realized due to the discriminatory lending practices of 
the nation's banks.2 
Imagine the following hypothetical situation. The Boyds submit a 
residential loan application to Quality Western Bank to secure a mort-
gage for a home they have contracted to purchase. On the loan appli-
cation, the Boyds reveal that they are black, and Quality Western 
proceeds to process the application. A credit check conducted by 
Quality Western indicates that the Boyds have not defaulted on any of 
their numerous credit accounts, but have made several late payments 
to some of their creditors. Nonetheless, all of the Boyds' creditors give 
them "1" ratings, the highest rating possible. A further evaluation 
shows that the Boyds' monthly housing expense to income ratio and 
* ARTICLES EDITOR, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
I THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 102-03 (2nd ed. 1990). 
2 See Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1351, 
1381 n.76 (1993). 
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their loan to value ratio are well within Quality Western's accepted 
guidelines. 
Unfortunately, Quality Western rejects the Boyds' loan application 
and the family is unable to purchase the home for which they had 
originally contracted. Quality Western notes the Boyds' late credit 
payments as the cause of their rejection. Later, the Boyds discover that 
at least six applications made by white couples for loans were approved 
by Quality Western even though their credit histories also showed late 
payments to creditors. The Boyds are hurt and suspect that they have 
been treated differently because of their race. 
Several recent studies indicate that Mrican-American and His-
panic applicants are denied home loans more than twice as often as 
comparable Caucasian applicants.3 The Federal Reserve Board, under 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) conducted a series of 
studies based on disclosed data concerning the geographic, racial, and 
financial distribution of home mortgage loans by the nation's banks.4 
This study, while criticized as inconclusive, was eventually validated by 
a later Federal Reserve Bank of Boston survey.5 Both studies found that 
minority mortgage loan applicants were denied mortgages more fre-
quently than comparable white applicants.6 
Since the early 1990s, the Justice Department has shown an emerg-
ing interest in filing claims for minority applicants who feel that they 
have been denied mortgage loans due to their race. However, the 
Justice Department's emerging concern is ineffective at providing re-
lief for the individual litigant, since Justice Department claims can only 
be filed after a "pattern" of mortgage discrimination has been docu-
mented. 
This Note argues, however, that the government's regulation of 
these lenders, as mandated by legislation, is shamefully inadequate. 
Further, private claims against these discriminating lenders have, until 
recently, been slowed or denied by the judicial system. 
In Part II, this Note seeks to prove that mortgage discrimination 
exists and continues to be practiced by this nation's banking institu-
tions. Part II outlines several contemporary studies and surveys con-
cerning discriminatory mortgage lending patterns which provide evi-
dence of discrimination in mortgage lending. Further, regulators and 
3 See Glenn B. Canner & Delores S. Smith, Expanded Data on Residential Lending, 77 FED. 
RESERVE BULL. 859, 859 (1991). 
4 See id. 
5 See Race-Based Loan Disparity Persists, According to New Study by Boston Fed, 59 Banking Rep. 
(BNA) 559 (Oct. 19, 1992) [hereinafter Race-Based Loan Disparityl. 
6 See id. 
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leading economists generally accept this evidence as proof of a pattern 
of mortgage discrimination by the nation's lenders. 
Part III outlines the shortcomings of legislation in providing legal 
relief to minority claimants. Part IV documents the lack of success 
individual litigants alleging mortgage discrimination have faced in 
federal and state courts. 
Part V analyzes the Department of Justice's response to mortgage 
discrimination. Although many commentators argue that the Justice 
Department's efforts in the Decatur Federal Savings and Loan case 
marked the watershed for mortgage discrimination prevention, the 
Decatur case fails to provide precedent for individual litigants alleging 
a single instance of mortgage discrimination. In light of the Decatur 
and subsequent Shawmut settlements, the Justice Department, on be-
half of individual litigants, may only bring a cause of action after the 
Federal Reserve Board or a similar administrative agency has uncov-
ered dozens of other episodes of mortgage discrimination from the 
same lender. 
This Note concludes that the present legislative acts and federal 
regulatory measures are sadly incapable of eliminating discrimination 
in mortgage lending. Without provisions in these legislative acts for 
individual causes of action in the nation's courts, minorities subjected 
to discriminatory mortgage lending will be forced once again to swal-
low the "bitter pill" of inequity. 
II. EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATORY MORTGAGE LENDING PRACTICES: 
CONTEMPORARY STUDIES AND SURVEYS 
Until recently, the existence of mortgage discrimination or redlin-
ing7 had not been examined or documented.s Without strong evidence 
7 Redlining is a term used to refer to a pattern of discrimination in which financial institu-
tions refuse to make mortgage loans, regardless of credit record of the applicant, on properties 
in specified areas because of alleged deteriorating conditions. At one time, lenders actually 
outlined these areas with a red pencil. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (6th ed. 1990). 
8 Documented discrimination in mortgage lending is relatively new. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL 
ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING 
HMDADATA 9 n.4 (1992) [hereinafter BOSTON STUDY]. In 1977, the Comptroller of the Currency 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation sponsored a nationwide survey to determine what 
economic characteristics were important in bank lending decisions and whether race or sex 
entered into the determination. Id. Based on an analysis ofroughly 5,000 completed returns, the 
researchers found that race played a statistically significant, although not particularly large, role 
in the lending decision. Id. In 1978, a study was conducted by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board. Id. Examiners collected data for 4,776 mortgage applications in a special examination of 
federally insured savings and loan associations in Miami, San Antonio, and Toledo. Id. The study 
found statistically significant evidence that black and Hispanic applicants were more likely to be 
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revealing a pattern of mortgage discrimination, federal regulators were 
not able to recognize discrimination as a pervasive problem in mort-
gage lending. The HMDA Studies of 1990 and 1991 and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston Study of 1992 provided this evidence and 
support through the compilation and examination of thousands of 
mortgage loan applications. All three studies revealed that mortgage 
discrimination is a serious problem among mortgage lenders. More 
importantly, the studies forced the banking community and the nation 
to recognize the existence of mortgage discrimination and its devastat-
ing impact upon minority families. 
A. The HMDA Studies 
Since 1976, most banks and other depository institutions that have 
offices in metropolitan areas have been required, under the HMDA, 
to disclose to the public information about the geographic distribution 
of their loans for home purchase and home improvement.9 Both the 
1990 and 1991 HMDA data, compiled by the Federal Financial Insti-
tutions Examination Council (FFIEC) , have raised questions concern-
ing the efforts of metropolitan banks to meet the credit needs of 
low-income and minority applicants in their communities. lO More im-
portantly, the HMDA data allows federal agencies, including the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to ensure that covered 
institutions comply with the fair lending laws, and the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA).J1 
In disclosure statements released to the public in October of 1991, 
lenders, for the first time, reported on all home loan applications they 
received, including the race, national origin, gender, and annual in-
denied than comparable white applicants. ld. The researchers speculated that differences in 
credit histories might have contributed to this result, but lacked the data to test this hypothesis. 
ld. Finally, in 1981, the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies published an extensive study 
of mortgage lending decisions in New York and California; one portion of this study focused on 
individual applications. ld. Mortgage application data were provided by state-regulated savings 
and loans in California and all state-regulated commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and 
savings and loans in New York. ld. Based on the information included in a very large sample of 
loans, the authors determined that blacks had a much greater chance of denial than white 
applicants with equivalent socioeconomic, property, and neighborhood characteristics. ld. 
g Canner & Smith, supra note 3, at 859. 
10 See id. The study states: 'The data have revealed wide variations in the number and dollar 
volume of loans approved across neighborhoods grouped by the income and race of residents." 
The 1990 and 1991 data lead many economists to believe that lenders do not treat applicants for 
home loans "fairly, and on a racially nondiscriminatory basis." ld. 
11 ld. at 859-60. The fair lending laws refer to the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity 
Acts. ld. at 860. 
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comes of their applicants. 12 The Federal Reserve Board warned, how-
ever, that the data is limited and cannot be used as conclusive evidence 
of discriminatory lending practices.13 Nevertheless, the most recent 
amendments contained in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) ofl989, extended the HMDA's survey 
to non-depository, independent mortgage companies when identifying 
possible discriminatory lending patterns.14 
1. The 1990 HMDA Data 
The 1990 HMDA study, conducted by the FFIEC, compiled disclo-
sure statements from almost 9,300 financial institutions. 15 The data 
revealed that Mrican-American and Hispanic applicants were more 
likely to be denied home loans than white or Asian applicants with 
comparable incomes. 16 Nationally, about 14.4% of white applicants 
for conventional home purchase loans were denied credit in 1990, 
while the denial rate for Mrican-American and Hispanic applicants was 
33.9% and 21.4%, respectivelyY Also, the 1990 HMDA data revealed 
that the denial rate increased as the annual income of the applicants 
decreased. IS Although the 1990 HMDA data presents a statistical link 
12Id. at 859. 
13 See id. Foremost among these limitations is a lack of information about factors that are 
important in determining the creditworthiness of applicants and the adequacy of the collateral 
offered as security for their loans. Without taking into account such information, one cannot 
determine whether individual applicants or applicants grouped by a common characteristic (such 
as race or gender) have been treated fairly. Id. 
14Id. at 860. The FIRREA amendments allowed the 1990 HMDA Study to compile lending 
information from more than four hundred independent mortgage companies (lenders unaffili-
ated with depository institutions). Id. 
15Id. at 863. The Board's approach to collecting the data is a relatively simple one that 
minimizes the burden on the reporting institutions and, at the same time, provides a reporting 
format that offers a large base of information for use by the public and the supervisory agencies. 
Id. at 861. Covered institutions record data for each loan application acted on and each loan 
purchased on a separate line of a reporting form, the Loan/Application Register (LAR). Id. at 
862. At the end of the year, the institutions submit the LARs to their respective supervisory 
agencies, which send them to the Federal Reserve Board for processing. Id. The Board, acting 
on behalf of the FFIEC [Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council], produces disclosure 
statements and sends them to the reporting institutions for release to the public. Id. Under this 
system, institutions collect the required information but do not have to undertake the additional 
costly step of preparing their own disclosure statements, which would involve sorting and aggre-
gating their data in multiple cross-tabulations. Id. The Federal Reserve Board processed 23,891 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) reports representing 9,281 financial institutions. Id. at 863. 
16 See id. at 868. 
17Id. At 12.9%, the denial rate for applicants of Asian extraction was lower than for any other 
racial or ethnic group. Id. 
18 See id. Nationwide, 78.9% of the loan applicants whose income equaled or exceeded the 
median family income for their MSA (metropolitan statistical area) were approved for conven-
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between an applicant's race and home loan denial, the Federal Reserve 
Board originally refused to present the study as evidence of systematic 
discriminatory lending.19 
2. The 1991 HMDA Data 
Although the Federal Reserve Board was hesitant to link the 
findings of the 1990 HMDA study to mortgage discrimination, the 1991 
HMDA study clearly confirmed the Federal Reserve Board's suspicion 
concerning discriminatory lending practices by the nation's banks.20 
The 1991 survey included disclosure statements from 9,358 lenders, 
including banks, thrifts, credit unions, and mortgage banks, and in-
volved approximately 7.9 million applications.21 For Mrican Americans, 
the denial rate dropped slightly in 1991, yet remained nearly 2.2 times 
that of white applicants.22 For Hispanics, the denial rate in 1991 rose 
to 1.54 times that of white applicants.23 
In response to the poor showing reported by the FFIEC, the banks 
involved in the study insisted that the recession's impact on lending 
contributed to the discouraging results, and that the late release of the 
1990 data left them little time to change their ways.24 Some banks stated 
that their increased outreach into minority communities drastically 
increased the number of low-income applicants, many of whom had 
to be turned down. 25 
For many community activists and minority leaders, however, the 
1991 HMDA data vividly documented a pattern of racial discrimination 
in mortgage lending that could not be absolved through claims of 
tional home purchase loans, compared with 69.4% of the loan applicants with lower incomes. 
Differences are even greater when comparisons are made at the extremes of the income distri-
butions. Id. at 868--69. 
19 See id. at 873--76. As discussed in the following section, the 1990 HMDA data was attacked 
by mortgage lenders involved in the survey. 
20 See Claudia Cummins, Fed Reports Little Change In Loan Bias, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1992, 
at 1. The Federal Reserve Board asserted: "Despite increased attention to discrimination, mort-
gage lenders did not significantly improve their racial-bias record last year." Id. 
21Id. at 1, 14. 
22 Id. at 1. In 1990, the denial rate for African-American applicants was 2.35 times that of 
white applicants. Id. 
23Id. In 1990, the denial rate for Hispanic applicants was 1.49 times that of white applicants. 
Id. 
24Id. at 14. "The numbers came out so late in 1991, there really was no opportunity for the 
industry to analyze and correct anything [for 1991]," said David Fynn, vice-president of National 
City Corporation in Cleveland. Id. 
25Id. The Fed found that the number of loan applications from low-income people increased 
significantly in 1991, possibly reflecting lenders' efforts to reach and educate poorer communi-
ties. Id. The overall denial rate increased to 18.9% in 1991 from 16.1 %. Id. 
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economic abnormalities and lack of notice. 26 "The report really casts 
doubt on the integrity of the agencies," said Deepak Bhargava of the 
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (Acorn).27 
While many lending institutions argue that the HMDA studies do not 
consider all of the financial determinants necessary for mortgage eli-
gibility, the conclusions reached in the Federal Reserve Bank of Bos-
ton's extensive 1990 study confirmed the Federal Reserve Board's data 
and silenced many of the HMDA's critics.28 
B. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study (Boston Study) was 
initiated after a review of the 1990 HMDA data revealed that minorities 
in the metropolitan Boston area were 2.7 times more likely to be 
denied a mortgage loan than white applicants with similar incomes.29 
In an attempt to appease critics of the HMDA studies, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston sought to include many of the factors which 
were absent from the HMDA studies.30 
The Boston Study considered a total of thirty-eight additional 
factors which impact lending decisions, including credit history and 
loan collateral.3I These variables were selected on the basis of numer-
ous conversation with lenders, underwriters, and others familiar with 
the lending process.32 The 38 additional factors were placed into the 
following groupings: ability of applicant to support loan, risk of de-
26 See id. 
27Id. Bhargava asserted: "1 think they're trying to spin the numbers and deflect attention 
from what has been an abominable record of enforcement over the past decade. Id. Bhargava 
went further to state, 'They [the lenders] are trying to forestall any serious enforcement efforts 
by Congress and prevent both [the Department of Housing and Urban Development] and the 
Justice Department from intervening in fair lending enforcement." Id. 
28 See id. The 1991 HMDA update follows a more comprehensive Fed study of mortgage 
lending in the Boston area, which dug deeper into the 1990 [HMDA] data. The Boston study 
showed that even after accounting for important financial characteristics not included in the 
HMDA data, blacks and Hispanics were still 60% more likely to be denied a mortgage than whites. 
Id. Because the Boston study presented a more thorough picture of the factors influencing 
mortgage denials, it has largely put to rest questions of the HMDA survey's validity. Id. 
29 See BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 1-2; see also Race-Based Loan Disparity, supra note 5, 
at 559. 
30 See BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 1. 
31 Race-Based Loan Disparity, supra note 5, at 559. Critics of the 1990 HMDA study argued 
that credit history and loan collateral, factors not included in the HMDA's studies, were necessary 
to accurately assess patterns of lending discrimination. The Boston Study, whose data resembles 
the figures compiled by the HMDA studies, includes both credit history and loan collateral (along 
with 36 other factors). See id.; see also BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 13. 
32 BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 13. Most of the variables came from standard loan 
application forms, while several were taken from credit reports and lenders' worksheets. Id. 
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fault, potential default loss, loan characteristics, and personal charac-
teristics.33 
The applicant's ability to support the loan was measured by tabu-
lating that applicant's "obligation ratio" and wealth.34 The obligation 
ratio is comprised of the applicant's proposed housing expenses rela-
tive to income and total debt payment obligations relative to income.35 
The obligation ratio helps to determine more clearly whether the 
applicant can afford the mortgage, than would an evaluation of in-
come alone.36 Economists contend that wealth may also be important 
to the lender's decision, since substantial wealth can make debt repay-
ment easy even when income is low and obligation ratios are high.37 
The applicant's risk of default was determined by considering two 
factors: the reliability of the borrower and the stability of the bor-
rower's income.38 To determine the reliability of the borrower, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston explored the prospective borrower's 
past credit history, including public record of default, foreclosure, or 
bankruptcy.39 The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston also looked at the 
applicant's profession, seniority, experience, age, and education to 
ascertain the stability of the applicant's income.4o Many lenders con-
sider these factors to determine how easily the applicant will be able 
to carry the mortgage not only now, but also over an extended period.4l 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston also understood that many 
lenders are concerned not only about the possibility of default, but the 
magnitude of the loss should default and foreclosure occur.42 To ac-
count for these considerations, the Boston Study tabulated the appli-
cant's loan-to-value ratio, the ability of the applicant to obtain private 
mortgage insurance, and neighborhood characteristics that might af-
fect the stability of the value of the mortgaged property.43 
33Id. at 14-18. 
34Id. at 14. 
35Id. 
36Id. 
37Id. Not only can wealthy individuals spend down their wealth, but liquid assets can also be 
a cushion that prevents a temporary job loss or other income disruption from resulting in a 
mortgage default. Id. 
38 Id. at 14-15. 
39Id. at 15. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. This information was used to calculate a rough estimate of the probability that the 
applicant would become unemployed. Id. 
42 See id. at 16. 
43Id. The loan-to-value ratio was calculated from the appraised value of the applicant's home 
and the amount of the loan. Applicants who are able to obtain private mortgage insurance reduce 
the potential loss to the lending institution. The stability of the value of the mortgage property 
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Finally, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston also considered vari-
ous characteristics concerning the applicants and their requested loans.44 
The loan characteristics included: the length of the loan; whether the 
interest rate was fixed or adjustable; whether the application was made 
under a program designed for low-income individuals; and whether 
the property was a single-family home, a condominium, or a building 
with two to four units.45 The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston also 
compiled personal characteristics of the applicant, including the ap-
plicant's age, marital status, and the number of dependents.46 In sum-
mary, the additional variables in the Boston Study were designed to 
secure all the financial, employment, and demographic information 
that lenders may have included in their determination to approve or 
deny a loan applicationY 
The Boston Study collected data from all 1,200 applications for 
conventional mortgage loans made by Mrican Americans and Hispan-
ics in 1990, and from a random sample of 3,300 applications from 
whites in the Boston Metropolitan area.48 According to the Boston 
Study, Mrican-American and Hispanic applicants with the same eco-
nomic and property characteristics as white applicants experienced a 
denial rate of 17%, compared to the denial rate of 11 % for white 
applican ts. 49 
The Boston Study also found that minorities with unblemished 
credit were approved for mortgages 97% of the time; however, dispari-
ties between the denial rate of minority and white applicants developed 
when the respective borrowers had a less than perfect credit history 
and lenders were forced to use discretion in assessing compensating 
factors. 5o The authors of the Boston Study state: "Lenders seem to be 
is often considered by lending institutions because inner-city properties are frequently thought 
to carry a higher risk of capital loss than properties in other areas. Lenders may be economically 
motivated to avoid investing in areas that are perceived to be risky. [d. at 16-17. 
44Id. at 18. 
45Id. 
46 Id. 
47Id. 
48Id. at 1; see also Race-Based Loan Disparity, supra note 5, at 559. 
49 BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 2; Race-Based Loan Disparity, supra note 5, at 559. 
50 BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 2-3; Race-Based Loan Disparity, supra note 5, at 559. The 
results of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study suggest that for the same imperfections, 
whites seem to enjoy a general presumption of creditworthiness that black and Hispanic appli-
cants do not, and that lenders seem to be more willing to overlook flaws for white applicants than 
for minority applicants. BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 3. 
A lender's discretionary control over accepting and rejecting loans rests at the heart of 
mortgage discrimination. The mortgage application and approval procedure is complex, yet 
generally consists of three steps: a quick review of the application for viability, verification of the 
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more willing to overlook flaws for white applicants than minority ap-
plicants. "51 This discretionary zone of compensating factors provides a 
breeding ground for discriminatory mortgage lending practices. 52 
The Boston Study also revealed how societal discrimination effects 
the mortgage lending process.53 If Mrican Americans and Hispanics 
are discouraged from moving into predominantly white areas, they will 
limit their search to neighborhoods sanctioned for minorities.54 These 
tend to be older central cities with high-density housing, such as two-
to four- family homes.55 Denial of a mortgage loan application on the 
basis of either of these economic or property characteristics would not 
be considered discriminatory for the purposes of the Boston Study.56 
In addition, many minorities may be discouraged from even applying 
for a mortgage loan as a result of a pre-screening process.57 White 
applicants may also be more likely than minority applicants to be 
"coached" when filling out the application and will therefore have 
stronger applications than similarly situated minorities.58 
The Boston Study provided substantial evidence that race plays an 
important role in mortgage lending.59 The study forced many promi-
nent members of the banking community to recognize the existence 
of discriminatory mortgage lending practices by many of the nation's 
banks.5O Federal Reserve Board Governor John P. LaWare stated, "This 
may be a bitter pill, especially for those who believe that their institu-
information and an appraisal of the property, and an evaluation of the numbers and considera-
tion of any "compensating factors." Discrimination, due to a lending officer's discretion, can 
occur at the initial review, which involves the completion of an application and an explicit denial 
or encouragement by the lender, or when lenders are left considerable room for subjectivity and 
discretion during the review of an imperfect applicant. For the imperfect applicant, "compensat-
ing factors," including a large down payment, a high level of liquid assets, and an excellent 
potential for future earnings based on education and training, may be used to offset negatives. 
See BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 10-12. 
51 Race-Based Loan Disparity, supra note 5, at 559. The authors of the Boston Study also write, 
"The results of the study suggest that given the same imperfections in mortgage applications, 
whites seem to enjoy a general presumption of creditworthiness that blacks and Hispanics do 
not." Id. 
52 See id. 
53 See BOSTON STUDY, supra note 8, at 43. 
54Id. 
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58Id. 
59 See Race-Based Loan Disparity, supra note 5, at 559. 
60Id. Federal Reserve Board Governor John P. LaWare addressed mortgage discrimination 
during an Oct. 8, 1992 conference in Denver, Colorado, asserting that the new study [Boston 
Study)--combined with last year's HMDA data [1990 HMDA Study) and research by private 
parties-means the debate over disparate treatment in mortgage markets is essentially over. Id. 
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tions treat all applicants for credit equally, regardless of race. But 
frankly, it would be too much to assume that attitudes about race held 
by some in our society do not seep into the lending process."51 Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston President Richard Syron cautioned that al-
though racial disparity is reduced when additional factors are consid-
ered, "it remains significant and it must be faced directly ... [u]nfortu-
nately, race plays a role, perhaps an unconscious and unintentional 
role, but a role nonetheless, in mortgage lending decisions. "52 Al-
though the debate concerning the existence of disparate treatment in 
mortgage markets seemingly hal' concluded, the battle concerning the 
regulation of discriminatory mortgage lenders rages on.53 
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION: 
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS AND THE RESTRAINT OF DISCRIMINATING 
MORTGAGE LENDERS 
A. The Community Reinvestment Act 
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA)64 
with the explicit purpose and intent of encouraging banks and lending 
institutions to help meet the financial needs of the communities in 
which they operate.55 Section 2901 (b) of the CRA states that: 
[i] t is the purpose of this [legislation] to require each appro-
priate [£1 ederal financial supervisory agency to use its author-
ity when examining financial institutions, to encourage such 
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local com-
munities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe 
and sound operation of such institutions.55 
In essence, the CRA was enacted to eliminate the practice of red-
lining,fi7 
Under the CRA, federal regulatory agencies were required to: 
adopt regulations to assess banks' records of meeting the needs of their 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63 See id. 
64 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
65 Section 2901 (a) (1) states that regulated financial institutions are required by law to dem-
onstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which 
they are chartered to do business. 12 U.S.CA § 2901(a)(1). See also Laura E. Schotsky, Develop-
ments in Banking Law: 1992, Community Reinvestment Act, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 70, 70 (1993). 
6612 U.S.C. § 2901(b). 
67 See id. 
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communities, examine the community served by each bank, assess 
whether the bank adequately served that community, and use eRA 
assessments to determine whether to accept a bank's application for a 
deposit facility.68 Section 2903(a) calls for federal financial supervisory 
agencies to assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs 
of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods and to take such record into account in its evaluation of an 
application for a deposit facility by such an institution.69 
Overall, the eRA instructed regulatory agencies to "encourage" 
institutions to help meet the credit needs of local communities, "con-
sistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions."7o Yet, 
the eRA failed to define such vital terms as "credit needs," "local 
communities," or "safe and sound operation."7! Therefore, the eRA 
was immediately subjected to widespread criticism by commentators 
and banking officials who failed to ascertain the meaning of the Act's 
vague language. 72 
The nation's banks attacked the eRA on several grounds.73 Bank-
ers argued that the addition of mortgage loans, credit, and related 
services to satisfy community needs would jeopardize the safety and 
soundness principles protected by the Act.74 In addition, banks argued 
that the eRA infringed upon free market principles of supply and 
demand by allegedly forcing banks to make bad loans and maintain 
high levels of credit.75 Finally, banking leaders complained that eRA 
standards were unclear, and consequently, precluded them from com-
plying with eRA requirements. 76 
Despite the opposition and confusion regarding the eRA, the 
nation's banks experienced little difficulty with mergers and acquisi-
tions during the initial years of the eRA's enactment.77 The eRA gives 
68 See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a). See also Schotsky, supra note 65, at 70. 
69 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a). 
70 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (b) & § 2903(a)(1). See also Mollee Bennett, Note, Resolving the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act Dilemma: Eliminating "Whites Only" MMtgage Lending While Reducing Regula-
tMy Red Tape, 24 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1145, 1148 (1993). 
7112 U.S.C. § 2901 (b) & § 2903(a) (1). The CRA defines such terms as "appropriate Federal 
Financial supervisory agency," "regulated financial institution," and "application for a deposit 
facility," yet fails to specity vital terms including "credit needs," "local communities," or "safe and 
sound operation." 12 U.S.C. § 2902. 
72 See Bennett, supra note 70, at 1145. 
73 See Mario Alvarado, Revisiting the Community Reinvestment Act in an Era of Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 475, 480-81 (1993). 
74 See id. at 480. 
75Id. 
76Id. at 481. 
77Id. at 481; see also Bennett, supra note 70, at 1145. 
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Federal financial supervisory agencies the power to consider a lending 
institution's record of meeting the credit needs of low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods when evaluating that institution's application 
for a deposit facility.78 To satisfY section 2903, the nation's lenders 
simply devised lending programs, inflated by slogans of "community 
commitment," when CRA compliance was needed.79 The regulatory 
agencies rarely issued poor compliance ratings, let alone charter or 
branch application rejections. 
Due to the CRA's ineffectiveness and lax regulatory enforcement, 
Congress decided to amend the Act in 1988. The amended Community 
Reinvestment Act requires banks and thrifts to meet the credit needs 
of their entire communities, including low- and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods.80 Mter examining a lending institution under section 2903, 
the Federal financial supervisory agency must prepare a written evalu-
ation of the institution's record of meeting the credit needs oflow- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods.8! Through public reports, such as 
the HMDA studies, financial institutions' efforts to comply with the 
CRA are rated "outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs improvement," or 
"substantial compliance."82 Regulators can use these ratings to block a 
lender's bid to acquire other banks or build new branches.83 However, 
since 1977, some 70,000 bids for expansions, mergers and acquisitions 
have been scrutinized under the CRA, of which only twenty bids have 
78 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a). 
79 Bennett, supra note 70, at 1145. 
80 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07. Under CRA, financial institutions must determine the credit needs 
of their communities and adopt policies, procedures. programs and products accordingly. Caro-
lyn M. Brown, How to Fight Mortgage Discrimination . .. And Win!!, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Jul. 1993, 
at 48. 
81 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a). 
82 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b). HMDA studies apply to depository and independent institutions with 
assets exceeding $10 million and a home or branch office in a metropolitan statistical area. 
Canner & Smith, supra note 3, at 860. The written evaluations must include a public section and 
a confidential section. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a) (2). The public section of the written evaluation shall: 
state the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency's conclusions for each assessment 
factor identified in the regulations prescribed by the Federal financial supervisory agencies, 
discuss the facts and data supporting such conclusions, and contain the institution's rating and 
a statement describing the basis for the rating. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b). The confidential section of 
the written evaluation must contain: all references that identity any customer of the institution, 
any employee or officer of the institution, or any person or organization that has provided 
information in confidence to a Federal or State financial supervisory agency; and any statements 
obtained or made by the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency in the course of an 
examination which, in the judgment of the agency, are too sensitive or speculative in nature to 
disclose to the institution or the public. 12 U.S.c. § 2906(c). 
83 See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2); see also Brown, supra note 80, at 48. 
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been rejected for poor CRA compliance.84 The CRA's enforcement 
power has remained dormant. 
Although the CRA has been instrumental in documenting and 
exposing systematic discriminatory mortgage lending,85 the Act is criti-
cized as an ineffective regulatory measure. More importantly, the CRA 
does not provide a cause of action or relief for private claimants.86 
B. The Fair Housing Act 
In 1968, Congress passed legislation which was intended to elimi-
nate and restrict any impediments or conduct which would discrimi-
natorily deny individuals "fair" housing otherwise reasonably available 
to others in the same position.87 The Fair Housing Act (FHA) was 
designed to attack a wide range of discriminatory practices in the 
housing and real estate industries.88 Section 3604 of the Act prohibits 
actions which deny minorities the right to buy, sell, or rent homes.89 
Courts have found that actions not specifically outlined in section 3604 
can violate the FHA if they have the effect of making housing unavail-
able based on a person's race.90 Section 3605 of the FHA expressly 
84 Brown, supra note 80, at 48. 
85 See Cummins, supra note 20, at 1; see also Canner & Smith, supra note 3, at 859. 
86 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07. See also Harambee Uhuru School, Inc. v. Kemp, No. C2-90-949, 
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15125 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 30, 1992). 
87 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1982 & Supp. I 1994). 
88 See id. 
89 42 U.S.C. § 3604 reads, in part: 
[I] t shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate 
for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because 
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental 
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, 
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any 
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 
status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimi-
nation. 
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, 
or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such 
dwelling is in fact so available. 
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by 
representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or 
persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. 
90 E.g., United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 296 
(1982); United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1042 (1975); United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. 
Ill. 1977), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 
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prohibits mortgage discrimination.91 Though Congress's intentions were 
noble, the FHA, as originally drafted, was ineffective at meeting these 
goals because the federal government's ability to enforce the Act's 
provisions were limited.92 
Under the FHA, complaints of discrimination in housing, real 
estate, or mortgage lending were addressed in one of two ways: the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)93 conducted 
an investigation and sought a conciliation of the housing discrimina-
tion complaint, or the aggrieved party would file a civil action under 
the FHA.94 HUD's authority only extended to initiating investigations 
of discrimination and conciliation proceedings. HUD had no authority 
to take enforcement action in court.95 
Enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair 
Housing Act sought to eliminate racial discrimination in the sale, 
rental, or financing of homes.96 On its face, the FHA appears to be a 
legal spearhead for civil rights claims and housing discrimination causes 
of action.97 However, the FHA is crippled by weak enforcement provi-
sions which only empower the Secretary of HUD98 to pursue com-
plaints by informal methods of conference, cooperation, conciliation, 
and persuasion.99 The Secretary of HUD may not initiate lawsuits against 
violators of the FHAlOO and may refer the case to the Justice Department 
only when the violation involves "a pattern or practice" of discrimina-
tion. IOI Most often, claims are lost between administrative channels and 
neglected.102 Due to this lack of enforcement, the FHA is an ineffective 
408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In Laufman, the court found that mortgage redlining violated 
§ 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act. 408 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
91 Section 3605(a) of the Fair Housing Act states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging 
in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in 
making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a 
transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or na-
tional origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). 
92Joseph D. Rich, Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, As Amended, By the Department of 
Justice, 46 Bus. LAw. 1335, 1335 (1991). 
93 A state or local human relations commission also acted on HUD's behalf. Charles Mathias, 
Jr., The Fair Housing Amendments Act, 15 REAL EST. LJ. 353, 354 (1987). 
94Id. 
95Rich, supra note 92, at 1335. 
96 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31. 
97 See id. 
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(b). 
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e). 
100 John Hugh Gilmore, Note, Insurance Redlining & The Fair Housing Act: The Lost Oppor-
tunity of Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 563, 574-75 (1985). 
101 42 U.S.C. §§ 361l(g) and 3614(a). 
102 See Gilmore, supra note 100, at 575. 
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legislative provision to seek judicial relief for mortgage discrimina-
tion.103 
C. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
Perhaps the most promising legal avenue for private mortgage 
discrimination claims is the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.104 Under 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Justice Department and private 
litigants have the authority to sue a financial institution if they believe 
that the bank or thrift has developed a pattern of discriminatory 
lending. lOS Section 1691 (a) states: "[i]t shall be unlawful for any credi-
tor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of 
a credit transaction, on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex or marital status, or age .... "106 A bank's inquiry into the 
applicant's marital status or age, however, does not constitute discrimi-
nation.107 
Although the Justice Department is engaged in an administrative 
tug-of-war with regulators concerning access to bank records and files, 
it has displayed a renewed interest in enforcing laws against loan 
discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. !Os As a result, 
the Justice Department, on September 17, 1992, filed the first lawsuit 
charging a mortgage institution, Decatur Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, with a pattern of discriminatory lending practices and 
racially biased mortgage marketing. 109 However, private litigants have 
had a difficult time proving mortgage discrimination under the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act. l1O 
IV. THE UNSUCCESSFUL PLIGHT OF PRIVATE LITIGANTS: CLAIMS 
BROUGHT UNDER THE CRA, ECOA, AND FHA 
Due to the banking regulators' inability to effectively eliminate 
mortgage discrimination, many mortgage applicants have been forced 
103 See id. 
104 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1982 & Supp. I 1994). See also Swain v. Decatur Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir 1993). 
105 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691. 
106 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a)(I). 
107 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b). 
108 See Claudia Cummins, Regulators, Justice Dept. In Turf Fight On Loan Bias, AM. BANKER, 
October 16, 1992, at 1. The Justice Department has been pushing for greater access to bank 
records while regulators have vigorously defended the confidentiality of data gathered in bank 
examinations. Id. 
109 See Swain v. Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Association, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1993). 
110 See, e.g., Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank oflndiana, 653 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Indiana 
1987) . 
1995) MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION 339 
to bring private causes of action against discriminating banks and 
others, alleging violations of the Community Reinvestment Act, the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Housing Act. lll The federal 
financial supervisory agencies which have been authorized to promul-
gate regulations ensuring just and non-discriminatory mortgage lend-
ing, including the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, have 
been unable to satisfY or remedy the legitimate claims of the minority 
mortgage applicant who asserts that she has been denied a home loan 
due to her race or sex. In a statement before the Subcommittee on 
Consumer Credit and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Mfairs, Lawrence B. Lindsey, a member of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, stated: 
It is well known that regulators have faced considerable difficul-
ties in identifYing instances of discrimination. It is extremely 
difficult to find conclusive evidence of discrimination through 
inspection of individual loan files during examinations. Lend-
ers usually can demonstrate that the applicant was denied 
because certain credit standards, involving such elements as 
debt ratios or credit history, were not met. ll2 
The regulators have simply been unable to detect and deter the 
discriminatory treatment of individual mortgage applicants by the na-
tion's lenders.ll3 
Thus, individual applicants have been forced to resort to litigation. 
However, because of the limiting language of the Community Reinvest-
ment Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Housing Act, 
many applicants, or community organizations representing individual 
applicants, lack standing to bring actions alleging mortgage discrimi-
nation against mortgage lenders.u4 Those applicants who have stand-
ing to bring a claim 115 are usually unable to establish a prima facie case 
III Some claims also allege a violation of several civil rights statutes, including the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. See, e.g., Evans v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 669 F. Supp. 915, 917 (N.D. 
Indiana 1987). 
112Lawrence B. Lindsey, Statements before the Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and 
Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Mfairs, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, (February 18, 1993), in 79 FED. RESERVE BULL. 285, 285 (1993). 
113 See id. 
114 See, e.g., Evans, 669 F. Supp. at 922-23. 
115 Courts have determined that there is neither an "explicit nor implicit private right of 
action under the Community Reinvestment Act." Harambee Uhuru School, Inc. v. Kemp, No. 
C2-90-949, 1992 WL 274545 at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1992). Therefore, standing for private 
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of racial discrimination due to the vague language of the acts and their 
interpretation by the courts. 1l6 
A. The Question of Standing 
Under the Community Reinvestment Act, the issue of standing for 
private litigants is quite simple; the CRA does not provide a cause of 
action for private individuals against banks that violate its provisions. 
The leading case for CRA standing is Harambee Uhuru School, Inc. v. 
Kemp.ll7 
Harambee Uhuru School, Inc., a non-profit preschool sought to 
solicit loans from community development block grant funds and 
private sources to purchase property for the school's use.ns The school 
obtained an $81,000 loan and a $30,000 rehabilitation grant from the 
city, yet found that an additional $150,000 was needed to complete the 
renovation. ll9 Despite the school's ability to offer real estate valued at 
$147,000 as collateral, the lender, Bank One, refused to loan either the 
requested $150,000 or any money at all. 120 Harambee asserted that the 
decision was racially motivated and in violation of the CRA.121 
In its opinion, the Harambee court first looked to the language of 
the Community Reinvestment Act. 122 The court was unable to find any 
express provisions which would authorize a private individual to file 
suit or to pursue other remedies for violations of its requirements. 123 
Next, the court applied the analysis laid out by the United States 
Supreme Court's opinion in Cort v. Ash124 to determine whether a 
private right of action should be implied from the CRA.125 The Court 
emphasized that the legislative intent of the Act did not suggest that 
causes of action can only be established in claims alleging violations of the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act or the Fair Housing Act. Id. 
ll6 See Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1337--41 (N.D. 
Indiana 1987) (suggesting that a clear definition for standing under the FHA and ECOA has not 
been determined by the courts). 
117 1992 WL 274545 (S.D. Ohio). 
ll8Id. at *1. 
119Id. 
120Id. 
121Id. 
12212 U.S.C. § 2901. 
123 1992 WL 274545 at *4. 
124422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
125 1992 WL 274545 at *4. Under Cort v. Ash, the court must consider: (1) whether the parties 
seeking to assert a right of action are members of a class for whose special benefit the statute was 
enacted; (2) whether there is evidence of a legislative intent to create such a remedy; (3) whether 
a private right of action would interfere with the purpose of the statute; and (4) whether any 
such claim would be traditionally a matter of state rather than federal law. Id. at *5. 
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"the Act was intended to prevent racially discriminatory lending poli-
cies;" rather, the "Act [was] designed to promote sound community 
banking policies and to insure that low and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods are not neglected. "126 Finally, the Court reasoned that Con-
gress intended to confer a duty upon the federal financial supervisory 
agencies, and that their silence in conferring a private right of action 
revealed their intent to prohibit these claims.127 Therefore, Harambee 
was denied standing to bring its private right of action under the 
Community Reinvestment Act. 128 
Since no private right of action is recognized under the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act, private litigants are forced to seek relief from 
the FHA and the ECOA Due to the enormous cost of litigation and 
the complexity of banking issues involved in a mortgage discrimination 
cause of action, many civil rights organizations and private non-profit 
foundations have attempted to represent these private litigants in mort-
gage discrimination suitS.129 Unfortunately, many of these organizations 
have had difficulty establishing standing under the ECOA or the FHA. 130 
In Evans v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 131 the plaintiffs, rep-
resented by and including the Northwest Indiana Open Housing Cen-
ter, Inc. (NIOHC) "allege[d] that First Federal discriminated in its 
lending practices by engaging in 'mortgage redlining."'132 The Evans 
court held that the Northwest Indiana Open Housing Center could 
not represent or join the plaintiffs claim of mortgage discrimination, 
despite the organization's commitment to the FHA and ECOA133 
The defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(l), asserting that the NIOHC lacked standing 
126Id. 
127Id. 
128 See id. at *6. 
129 See, e.g., Evans v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 669 F. Supp. 915, 917; see also 
Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, 724 F.2d 419, 421-22 (1984). 
130 These groups have also had difficulty establishing standing under the Civil Rights Acts, 
42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1994) and 42 u.s.c. § 1982 (1994). 
131 669 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ind. 1987). 
132Id. at 917. 
133Id. at 922-23. The NIOHC is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of 
Indiana and supported by private contributions and foundation grants. Id. at 917. The NIOHC 
is committed to furthering the goals of the FHA and the ECOA by providing several services for 
the Gary, Indiana community including: referral services, housing and financial counseling to 
minority homeseekers, investigation of complaints of housing discrimination, and legal repre-
sentation in actions involving discrimination. Id. at 917-18. 
While the NIOHC was suing on its own behalf, claiming that First Federal's alleged redlining 
significantly impaired, and continues to impair, its ability to provide services to the city of Gary, 
the NIOHC filed its complaint with James and Juanita Evans, a couple who applied for a mortgage 
loan to refinance their existing mortgage. Id. 
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to seek relief under the ECOA because the NIOHC did not suffer any 
actual or threatened injury.134 The court, turning to Article III of the 
United States Constitution, determined that in order for any party to 
have standing to bring suit in federal court, three requirements must 
be met: (1) the party must personally have suffered an actual or 
threatened injury caused by the defendant's allegedly illegal conduct, 
(2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged 
conduct, and (3) the injury must be one that is likely to be redressed 
through a favorable decision. 135 As such, the Evans court determined 
that the NIOHC did not personally suffer an actual or threatened 
injury due to First Federal's actions.136 
Article Ill's standing requirement was further limited by the Evans 
court when it applied a "zone of interests" standard whereby the court 
must "examine the language of the relevant statutory provision, the 
pertinent regulations, and the legislative history to discern the parame-
ters of the relevant zone of interest and to determine whether the 
interest of [plaintiff] arguably falls within the zone."137 Citing the Code 
of Federal Regulations, the Evans court determined that the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board has intended the ECOA to 
apply to "applicants" or "any person who requests or has received an 
extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or 
may become contractually liable regarding an extension of credit."138 
The court finally concluded that 
[b]ased on the unambiguous language found in the statute, 
its corresponding regulations, and its legislative history, the 
court holds that ... [the] NIOHC, which never applied for 
credit, is not an applicant for purposes of the ECOA and, 
thus, does not fall within the zone of protected interests 
contemplated by Congress when enacting the ECOA.139 
Similarly, in National Urban League v. Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency,140 the court held that the National Urban League lacked 
standing to commence a mortgage discrimination suit on behalf of a 
134 See id. at 920-21. 
135Id. at 920 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United to Separation of 
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982». In addition, Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
restricts the power of the federal judiciary to the resolution of "cases" or "controversies." Diamond 
v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986). 
136 See Evans v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 669 F. Supp, 915, 920-23 (N.D. Ind. 
1987). 
137Id. at 921. 
138Id. at 922 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e)(1987». 
139Id. at 922. 
14°78 F.R.D. 543 (D.D.C. 1978). 
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minority mortgage applicant.141 The National Urban League, along 
with ten other civil rights organizations, commenced a suit against four 
regulatory agencies142 for failing "to adopt what the coalition perceived 
to be appropriate examination and enforcement procedures necessary 
to alleviate racial discrimination by home mortgage lenders subject to 
federal regulation."143 The National Urban League explained that its 
objectives-improving the living and working conditions of blacks and 
other similarly disadvantaged minorities, fostering better race rela-
tions, and assisting black residents of low-income neighborhoods to 
find and finance standard housing outside such areas-were frustrated 
by the defendants' failure to effectively regulate mortgage discrimina-
tion.144 In addition, the National Urban League sought to represent 
one of its members, Birgit Fein, who had been denied a mortgage loan 
by the Bankers Trust Company for a $32,000 home she wanted to buy 
in Brooklyn.145 The bank alleged that its home mortgages were only 
available for applicants who earn $100,000 a year, and thereby Ms. 
Fein's financial situation constituted an "exceptional circumstance."146 
The National Urban League court was not convinced that the level 
of harm suffered by the National Urban League was sufficient to 
establish standing.147 Citing Warth v. Seldin,148 the court reasoned that 
Article III of the Constitution requires a plaintiff to establish that either 
it or its members suffered injury in fact and that this injury was the 
consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will 
remove the harm.149 Here, this "irreducible constitutional minimum"15o 
was not met by the plaintiffs because the court determined that the 
frustration of the National Urban League's interest and commitment 
to the community and housing discrimination problems, no matter 
141Id. at 547. 
142 The four regulatory agencies are the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve Board. Id. at 
544. 
143Id. The National Urban League asserted that appropriate examination and enforcement 
procedures to combat racial discrimination by home mortgage lenders are necessary to facilitate 
the Fair Housing Act. See id. at 545. 
144 See id. at 545-47. 
145Id. at 545. 
146 [d. Ms. Fein stated that after explaining its "exceptional circumstance" exception, the 
Bankers Trust Company "did not ask her for any information regarding her credit record or 
income or the house and did not offer an application." [d. 
147 [d. at 546-47. 
148 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975). The plaintiff, the National Urban League, relied upon 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), to demonstrate that suits brought 
under Title VIII should be defined "as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." 
National Urban League, 78 F.R.D. at 546. 
149 National Urban League, 78 F.R.D. at 546. 
150 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 277 n.16 (1974). 
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how strong, could not amount to an "injury in fact. "151 In addition, the 
court held that Birgit Fein lacked standing because her allegations of 
discrimination lacked a sufficient causal relationship to her dealing 
with Bankers Trust. 152 
B. Judicial Standard for ECOA and FHA Claims 
In Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana,153 James and 
Rosie Thomas, Mrican-American citizens of Gary, Indiana, applied for 
a loan from First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana with the intention 
of using the money to payoff a $6,000 balance on a conditional sales 
contract for the purchase of real estate property located next door to 
their residence. 154 The Thomases applied for a loan in the amount of 
$7,100.155 The Thomases planned to use their home as collateral for 
the loan, and First Federal determined that an appraisal of their 
property was necessary.156 The Thomases showed the First Federal 
appraiser, Mr. Beckham, the entire house and its many renovations. 157 
151 See National Urban League, 78 ER.D. at 546. The court also concluded that the National 
Urban League's expenditures in combating the problem of housing discrimination could not 
establish "injury in fact," even when the benefits of these expenditures were frustrated by home 
mortgage lenders who allegedly discriminate. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly 
held in favor of this proposition, the court derived this questionable principle from the "impli-
cations" and "tone" of previous Supreme Court holdings. Id. The court states: 
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly determined whether an organi-
zation's expenditures in combating a general problem are sufficient to establish 
"injury in fact" in a lawsuit on the same subject matter, the tone of its decisions 
indicates that they are not. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization 
[426 U.S. at 40], a case in which plaintiff quite likely did expend such funds, the 
Court explicitly stated not only that no injury to the plaintiff institution had been 
shown, but that in addition no such injury could be shown. Many other cases appear 
also to have implicitly so held. In Sierra Club v. Morton [405 U.S. 727 (1972)], for 
example, standing was denied plaintiff despite the near certainty that the plaintiff 
club had previously devoted considerable funds to obtain the result sought in the 
lawsuit. 
Id. at 547. 
152Id. Since Birgit Fein lacked standing, the National Urban League could not sue as her 
representative. Id. 
153 653 E Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1987). 
154Id. at 1333. 
155Id. 
156Id. Mter the Thomases paid an application fee of two hundred dollars, First Federal 
informed them that a real estate appraiser would be sent to their home on a particular date. 
Mter failing to arrive on two scheduled dates, the appraiser, Mr. Beckham, who was employed by 
First Federal as in-house and chief appraiser, finally showed up. Id. 
157Id. Among the many repairs and renovations listed by the Thomases were: an alarm system 
($1,400); kitchen improvements ($3,000, materials alone); new thermal picture window, 18' x 15' 
($1,000); storm windows throughout the house ($1,500); a new roof ($1,800); and a newly 
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Mr. Beckham appraised the Thomases' home at $22,000.158 Approxi-
mately two to three weeks later, the Thomases were informed that their 
loan application had been denied because their loan-to-value ratio had 
exceeded First Federal's guidelines.159 As a result, the Thomases alleged 
that First Federal discriminated against them due to their race and 
redlined their neighborhood in violation of the Fair Housing Act and 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 160 
At the trial, the Thomases offered the testimony of an independent 
real estate appraiser, George Wilkes, who appraised the value of their 
home at $40,000.161 In addition, the Thomases submitted as evidence 
copies of mortgage loan disclosure statements prepared by First Fed-
eral for the years 1983 and 1984 pursuant to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act. 162 The Thomases attempted to show the total number 
and dollar amounts of loans made by First Federal in 1983 and 1984 
for neighboring communities like Gary, Hammond, and East Chi-
cago. 163 However, the court found no relevance in the mortgage loan 
disclosure statements. 164 
Without the aid of the mortgage loan disclosure statements, the 
court turned to the Thomases' discrimination claim under the Fair 
constructed addition to the den ($15,000). After noting these renovations, Beckham, the ap-
praiser, told the Thomases that if their house were located anywhere else it would be worth 
$100,000 and that the Thomases should have no problem getting the $7,100 loan. Id. 
158Id. at 1334. 
159Id. The Thomases had a first mortgage on their home of approximately $17,000 and they 
were requesting a second mortgage of $7,100. The total mortgage debt, had the loan been 
approved, would have been $24,100. Beckham appraised the Thomases' home at $22,000. When 
comparing the total mortgage debt, $24,1 00, to the appraised value of the property, $22,000, the 
loan-to-value ratio ($24,100 divided by $22,000) was over 105%. First Federal's guidelines for loan 
approval required that the loan-to-value ratio be 80% or less. Id. 
160Id. at 1332 (FHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 and 3605; ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.). The 
Thomases also alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. Id. 
161Id. at 1334. Mr. Wilkes's appraisal would have given the Thomases a loan-to-value ratio of 
approximately 60% [$24,100 divided by $40,000]. Mr. Beckham, First Federal's appraiser, was not 
able to present his appraisal methods since he was deceased by the time of the trial. See id. at 
1333-34. Wilkes explained that appraising was "more appropriately viewed as an art rather than 
an exact science" yet was not allowed to speculate as to Beckham's subjective evaluations and the 
discrepancies which existed between their appraisal values. Id. at 1334. Reviewing the "four 
corners" of Beckham's appraisal document, Wilkes disagreed with many of Beckham's methods 
and indicated that the low figure might have been the result of Beckham's assessment that the 
Thomases' home was "overimproved" for the neighborhood that it was in. Id. at 1335. Wilkes 
explained that when homeowners make improvements or additions to their homes they cannot 
always be assured that the sale price will reflect the exact dollar investment of the improvement 
or addition. See id. at 1335. For example, an $8,000 addition to a house valued at $30,000 does 
not necessarily mean the house will sell for $38,000. See id. 
162Id. at 1335. 
163Id. 
164 See id. at 1340. 
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Housing Act,165 Under section 3605 of the Act166, the court determined 
that a prima facie case of racial discrimination could only be shown if 
the Thomases proved (1) that they were members of a protected class; 
(2) that they applied and were qualified for a loan from defendant; 
(3) that the loan was rejected despite their qualifications; and (4) that 
defendant continued to approve loans for applicants with qualifica-
tions similar to those of the plaintiffs,167 
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Thomas court 
found that elements (1) and (3) were satisfied because the Thomases 
were Mrican-American citizens who were denied a loan,168 However, 
the court reasoned that the Thomases failed to establish a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination because credible evidence was not pre-
sented as to the Thomases' qualification for the loan or that First 
Federal made loans to other applicants who had similar qualifica-
tions,169 Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs need not 
prove actual intent to discriminate on the part of the defendant, a 
showing that "race was a motivating consideration in the [defendant's] 
165Id, at 1336. The Thomases' claim specifically alleges that First Federal discriminated 
individually against them by denying their loan application on the basis of their race. Id. at 
1336--37. The Thomases also assert that First Federal denied the loan application because of their 
practice of "red-lining" the Thomases' neighborhood. Id. at 1337. Red-lining is then defined by 
the court as "mortgage credit discrimination based on the characteristics of the neighborhood 
surrounding the would-be borrower's dwelling." Id. 
166Because the Thomases' allegations involved the availability of additional financing, and 
not the availability of housing, the court determined that section 3604 of the Act was not 
implicated. Id. at 1337. Section 3605 of the Act which deals specifically with "[dliscrimination in 
the financing of housing" was seen as the appropriate section under which to bring the Thomases' 
action.Id. 
167Id. at 1338. The court in Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana developed this 
standard after considering the line of cases which involve other forms of discrimination under 
the Fair Housing Act. See id. In Davis v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ind. 1984), a case 
involving discrimination in the rental of apartments, an articulated standard was developed which 
demanded that a violation of Section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act would only be found if: (1) 
the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) he or she applied for and was qualified to rent 
or purchase a certain property or housing; (3) he or she was rejected; and (4) the housing or 
rental opportunity remained available thereafter. Id. at 1337-38. In another case, Hamilton v. 
Svatik, 779 F.2d. 383, 387 (7th Cir. 1985), the court set forth a prima facie standard under Section 
3604 which required that (1) the plaintiff belong to a minority; (2) the defendant be aware of 
it; (3) the plaintiff was ready and able to accept defendant's offer to rent; and (4) the defendant 
refused to deal with the plaintiff. These earlier standards provided the basis for the Thomascourt's 
Section 3605 prima facie test. Id. at 1338. 
168Id. 
169Id. In its opinion, the court stated: 
[olne of First Federal's requirements for loan applicants is that their loan-to-value 
ratio, based on the appraised value of the collateral for the loan, be 80 percent or 
less. The Thomases did not meet First Federal's standard as their ratio was com-
puted to be in excess of 105 percent. Plaintiffs do not dispute or challenge the 
legitimacy of First Federal's guideline of 80 percent; instead, they argue that First 
Federal undervalued the Thomases' home in violation of the Fair Housing Act. 
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decision" to refuse the loan is necessary.170 The statistical evidence 
presented to the court through the home mortgage disclosure state-
ments was not enough to establish that race played any part in First 
Federal's decisions.l7! Therefore, the court held that First Federal did 
not discriminate in violation of the Fair Housing Act.172 
Turning to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act claim asserted by 
the Thomases, the court noted that courts and regulators have found 
violations of the ECOA when a showing of discrimination exists, or 
when an applicant is treated less favorably than other applicants. 173 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court held that: (1) there 
was no indication that the Thomases were treated any differently from 
other loan applicants at First Federal, (2) First Federal did not inten-
tionally discriminate against the Thomases, and (3) First Federal's loan 
practices did not have an impermissible adverse impact upon black 
applicants. 174 
Similarly, in Cartwright v. American Savings & Loan Association the 
plaintiff was unable to prove mortgage discrimination under either the 
Fair Housing Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 175 On August 
24, 1965, the plaintiff, Mary Cartwright, an Mrican-American woman, 
obtained a mortgage loan from the defendant, American Savings, for 
a single-family residence. 176 Twelve years later, in 1977, American Sav-
ings approved a second mortgage on Cartwright's single-family resi-
dence.I77 In 1980, Cartwright purchased several lots in an urban re-
newal area of East Hammond, Indiana.178 On August 28, 1980, Cartwright 
applied for a $90,000 home mortgage loan from American Savings to 
finance the construction of a home on the urban renewal property.179 
Louis Green, vice-president of American Savings charged with mort-
Id. 
Plaintiffs maintain that First Federal undervalued the Thomas home because of 
their race or, alternatively, because First Federal red-lined their neighborhood. 
170Id. at 1338-39. 
171 See id. at 1340. The court notes that the plaintiffs' attorneys offered no explanation of the 
meaning of the figures in the home mortgage disclosure statements. Id. Therefore, the court 
emphasizes that the figures, standing alone, could not provide evidence that race motivated First 
Federal in its decisionmaking. Id. 
172Id. at 1341. 
173 See id. at (The court's analysis stems from Anderson v. United Finance Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 
1276 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
174Id. 
Id. 
175 Cartwright v. American Sav. & Loan Assoc., 880 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1989). 
176Id. at 914. 
177Id. 
178Id. 
179Id. The Cartwrights estimated the approximate value of their new residence at $91,250. 
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gage loan responsibility, accepted the Cartwrights' application and 
application fee .ISO 
The testimony of Cartwright and Green differed as to the nature 
of their initial August meeting in 1980. IS1 Green asserted that American 
Savings and Loan began Cartwright's loan application yet could not 
make a decision on the loan because Cartwright failed to communicate 
with the bank due to "personal problems."ls2 Cartwright contended 
that she had contacted Green on numerous occasions and was assured 
that American Savings and Loan was "working on it. "IS3 
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's conclusion that 
Cartwright failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
under either the Fair Housing Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act. ls4 The trial court determined that Cartwright failed to establish a 
prima facie case under section 3605 of the Fair Housing Act because 
she failed to offer: 1) a comparison between American Savings and 
other lending institutions; 2) the relevant amount of total mortgage 
activity in all relevant areas; 3) the number of mortgage applications 
received by American Savings and the number of those applications 
rejected or withdrawn; or 4) a relationship of comparable transactions 
180Id. 
181Id. 
182Id. at 915. Green stated that upon receiving the Cartwrights' application, he conducted a 
credit check and attempted to appraise the Cartwrights' anticipated building venture. Id. at 914. 
The appraisal of the building venture was delayed because the appraiser was "having problems 
finding homes of comparable value in that particular area." Id. Green alleges that he next turned 
to Cartwright in an attempt to ascertain similar property values in that particular area. Id. 
According to Green, Cartwright thereafter failed to communicate the comparable housing infor-
mation she had agreed to provide and that he was awaiting the information to allow American 
Savings's loan committee "to make a decision on the loan, to put as much information as we can 
get to them." Id. at 915. As a result, he was unable to submit Cartwright's 1980 loan application 
to American Savings's loan committee for approval or rejection. Id. 
183Id. Cartwright asserts that she never promised to provide Green with information regard-
ing the value of comparable homes in the vicinity of Cartwright's property. Id. Cartwright also 
denied ever instructing American Savings and Loan to place her loan application "on hold" due 
to any "personal problems." Id. 
184Id. at 927. The trial court stated: 
American Savings' treatment of Mary and Lawrence Cartwrights' 1980 loan appli-
cation was not based upon the race of Mary and/or Lawrence Cartwright and the 
racial character of the community in which they intended to build. American 
Savings' treatment of Mary Cartwright's loan inquiries in 1982 was not based upon 
Cartwright's race and/ or sex or the racial character of the community in which she 
intended to build. American Savings has not engaged in the practice of "redlining" 
in the central Hammond area, and has in fact provided a significant number of 
mortgage loans in this area. 
Id. at 916. 
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from areas other than the area where the Cartwrights intended to 
build. 185 
Cartwright did provide information supplied by American Savings 
and Loan revealing that American Savings granted only two residential 
mortgage loans from January of 1980 through January of 1984 in the 
substantially black, urban area of Hammond containing Cartwright's 
property, while granting sixty-one residential mortgage loans in areas 
containing a zero to one percent black population.186 Cartwright ar-
gued that the disparity in the number of residential loans American 
Savings and Loan granted a minority area as opposed to a non-minority 
area constituted proof of redlining.187 The ,trial court found the data 
flawed because it failed to identify evidence of the number of residen-
tialloan applications American Savings and Loan received from finan-
cially qualified borrowers in any particular census tract or geographical 
area, and how many of those applications it rejected. 188 
In addition, the trial court held that Cartwright's financing of the 
anticipated building venture did not satisfy the language of section 
3604 which prohibits discrimination in the "sale or rental of hous-
ing."189 The trial court also concluded that Cartwright's claim was 
barred by the 180-day statute of limitations.19o 
As to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act claims, Cartwright alleged 
that American Savings and Loan violated section 1691 (a)(l) of the 
ECOA by requiring her to provide comparable housing information 
while refraining from imposing such a requirement on other borrow-
ers.l9l The appellate court dismissed this claim and determined that 
Cartwright was not required to supply such information but had vol-
unteered to supply the comparable housing data. 192 Cartwright further 
185 See id. at 922-23. 
186Id. at 922. American Savings and Loan granted thirty-six residential mortgage loans in 
census tract number 427, and twenty-five residential mortgage loans in census tract number 404, 
both of which, according to the 1980 census, have a zero to one percent black population. Id. 
187Id. 
188Id. The trial court went on to say that proof of the number of applications American 
Savings and Loan received from financially qualified borrowers is at the very heart of any 
redlining allegation. Id. The court was "unmoved" by the fact that American Savings and Loan 
granted only two loan applications between 1980 and 1984 in the predominantly black census 
tract 207. See id. 
189Id. at 924. 
190Id. at 925. 
191Id. at 925-26. Section 1691(a)(l) of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act states: "[ilt shall 
be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of 
a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or 
age .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(I). 
192 Cartwright, 880 F.2d at 926. 
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alleged that American Savings and Loan violated section 1691 (d)(l) 
by failing to notifY her that it either approved or rejected her loan 
application.193 Again, the appellate court dismissed Cartwright's claim 
asserting that Cartwright's representations to Green regarding her 
willingness to provide comparable housing information and her "per-
sonal problems" effectively and properly, in accepted business practice 
and procedure, mandated placing her application on hold, thus pre-
cluding American Savings and Loan from taking action one way or the 
other.194 
Although the appellate court in Cartwright appears extremely confi-
dent in its ruling and analysis, the practical implications of its decision 
leaves a great deal to be desired. Under Cartwright, a plaintiff would 
have to compile an enormous amount of data concerning the defen-
dant's mortgage lending patterns to effectively state a claim under the 
Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.195 In addition, 
all of this information must be compiled within or shortly after the 180 
days mandated by the Fair Housing Act's statute oflimitations.196 Mter 
considering the enormous number of hours needed to compile such 
daunting statistics and the plaintiffs need to rely on the allegedly 
discriminatory lending institution to supply much of this data, it ap-
pears unlikely that the Cartwright decision and the judicial standard 
for Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act claims would 
allow plaintiffs to bring viable causes of action, even when discrimina-
tion clearly exists. The amount of statistical data on mortgage lenders 
needed to satisfY FHA and ECOA claims is unjustly overwhelming. This 
dilemma is compounded when private litigants are not allowed to use 
data compiled under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act to support 
their causes of action. 
V. A CRITICISM OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO 
MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION 
While private litigants have been limited in their attempts to 
enforce the ECOA, FHA, and CRA in court, the Department of Justice 
193Id. Section 1691 (d) (1) states: "[wlithin thirty days ... after receipt of a completed application 
for credit, a creditor shall notify the applicant of its action on the application." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1691(d)(I). 
194 Cartwright, 880 F.2d at 926. 
195 See id. at 922. As stated earlier, this data includes: a comparison between the defendant 
and other lending institutions; the relevant amount of total mortgage activity in all relevant areas; 
the number of mortgage applications received by the defendant, and the number of those 
applications rejected or withdrawn; or a relationship of comparable transactions from areas other 
than the area where the plaintiff intends to build. Id. 
196 See id. at 925. 
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has displayed an interest in attacking financial institutions that have 
shown a pattern of discriminatory mortgage lending. According to 
Attorney General Janet Reno, racial and ethnic discrimination in the 
mortgage lending industry is "one of the most important civil rights 
issues facing this country. "197 As such, Attorney General Reno has made 
assurances that the Department of Justice will fulfill its law enforce-
ment responsibilities in the area of fair lending.1g8 
The Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act allow 
the Justice Department to assert its law enforcement authority against 
discriminating lenders.199 V nder both the FHA and the ECOA, the 
Attorney General may bring a pattern or practice lawsuit in federal 
court to challenge discrimination in lending.2°O In September of 1992, 
the Department of Justice, under the authority of the FHA and the 
ECOA, brought its first-ever pattern or practice discrimination lawsuit 
against a large mortgage lender, Decatur Federal Savings and Loan 
Association.201 This was followed in December of 1993 by the Depart-
ment of Justice's settlement agreement with Shawmut National Corpo-
ration to compensate minorities who were unfairly denied loans by its 
mortgage subsidiary. 202 
A. The Decatur Federal Case 
The Department of Justice, in September of 1992, filed its first 
pattern or practice race discrimination lawsuit against a large mortgage 
lender.203 Mter launching a three year probe into the lending practices 
of Atlanta's Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Association,204 the De-
partment of Justice found forty-eight cases in which black applicants 
were improperly denied home mortgages, seemingly because of their 
race.205 In the Justice Department lawsuit filed in V.S. District Court in 
197 janet Reno Attorney General Department of justice Senate Banking Fair Lending Enforcement 
and 1993 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, FDCH CONGRESSIONAL 'TESTIMONY (FDCH), Nov. 4, 
1993, at 1 [hereinafter Reno & Fair Lending Enforcement]. 
198Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. The remedies available under these laws include broad injunctive relief to end dis-
criminatory practices and ensure against their recurrence in the future, compensatory relief for 
the victims of past discrimination, punitive damages, and civil penalties. Id. 
2Olld. 
202Id. 
203 Jim King, Prosecutors to Pursue Mortgage Bias Decatur Federal Case Offers Model for Future 
Probes, ATLANTA]. & CONST., Sept. 18, 1992, at Fl. 
204Decatur Federal Saving and Loan Association is one of the largest originators of home 
mortgages in Atlanta, Georgia. Reno & Fair Lending Enforcement, supra note 197, at l. 
205King, supra note 203, at Fl. The probe was launched after a 1988 series in the Atlanta 
journal-Constitution revealed that the city's banks and S&Ls were making five times as many 
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Atlanta, Decatur Federal was charged with violating the Fair Housing 
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Acts.206 Specifically, the thrift was 
accused of avoiding black neighborhoods and improperly denying 
loans to black applicants.207 Although Decatur Federal maintained its 
innocence, it agreed to settle by providing $1 million208 to those forty-
eight Mrican-American applicants who were rejected for home mort-
gages between January 1988 and May 1992.209 In addition to paying the 
$1 million, Decatur Federal agreed to: expand its lending area to 
include all of Fulton County,210 which includes most of the city of 
Atlanta, advertise extensively in black-oriented newspapers and radio 
stations, target sales calls to real estate agents and builders active in 
black neighborhoods, make future decisions regarding branch loca-
tions only after considering its obligation to meet the credit needs of 
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, and open a branch or 
regional loan office in South Fulton County, a predominantly black 
section of Atlanta, within one year of the date of the consent decree.211 
As Attorney General Reno asserts, "[t]he suit against Decatur 
Federal Savings and Loan Association ... has been characterized by 
many as a wake up call that mortgage lending discrimination will not 
be tolerated-and that the Department of Justice has the will and 
investigative resources to take these cases to court. "212 Many of the 
nation's community activists share this position. Gale Cincotta, chair-
person for National People's Action213 stated, "[f]or 20 years, we've 
been carrying the torch ... [n] ow, finally, the government has taken 
this issue seriously. It's a real breakthrough."214In aJustice Department 
mortgages in Atlanta's middle-class white neighborhoods, as they were in comparable black ones. 
Id. The Justice Department looked at more than 4,000 loan files and determined that race was 
the significant factor in Decatur Federal's loan decisions, even after accounting for possible 
differences in income, credit history, debt levels, and other factors. MlYrtgages, DOJ Settles Dis-
crimination Suit Against Atlanta Home MlYrtgage Lender, DAILY REp. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) , Sept. 
18,1992, at 182 [hereinafter MlYrtgagesj. 
206 Id. at 182. 
207 Id. 
208 The $1 million settlement would amount to $20,833 on average for each of the forty-eight 
African-American applicants. 
209 Joeml Glenn Brenner, Atlanta Lender Settles Charges in First U.S. 'Redlining' Suit, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 18, 1992, at Fl. 
210 Prior to the settlement, Decatur Federal defined its lending market to exclude large 
portions of the black community in Fulton County. See Reno & Fair Lending EnflYrcement, supra 
note 197, at l. 
2ll Mortgages, supra note 205, at 182. 
212 Reno & Fair Lending EnflYrcement, supra note 197, at l. 
213National People's Action is one of the nation's leading advocates on fair-housing issues. 
214 Brenner, supra note 209, at Fl. DeboraiI Goldberg, acting director of the Center for 
Community Change, which assists low-income and minority groups on housing issues stated, ''This 
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statement, John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General of the Justice 
Department's Civil Rights division, said that the Decatur Federal action 
will serve as a model for investigating mortgage lending practices at 
other institutions.215 Undoubtedly, the Decatur Federal case represents 
an aggressive step on the part of the Department of Justice to eradicate 
mortgage discrimination from the nation's financial community. How-
ever, the Decatur Federal case, including the terms of the settlement 
agreement, the means used to reach the settlement, and the preceden-
tial value of the case, has several important shortcomings worth noting. 
The Department of Justice brought a federal case, under the FHA 
and ECOA, only after a three-year federal probe into mortgage lending 
practices in Atlanta revealed a pattern of discriminatory mortgage 
lending at Decatur Federal Savings and Loan.216 This approach to 
combating mortgage discrimination by the nation's lenders has several 
limitations. 
First, the Justice Department will only file federal suits against 
mortgage lenders whose lending practices reveal a clear and substantial 
pattern of mortgage discrimination.217 This approach is not helpful 
against small mortgage lenders who may only see three minority mort-
gage applications a year, yet deny all three applicants on blatantly 
discriminatory grounds. Also, individual applicants who have been 
subjected to mortgage discrimination must wait for a pattern of dis-
criminatory lending to arise. This substantial pattern of mortgage 
discrimination may not manifest itself, yet the validity of the individual 
applicant's claim has not diminished. 
Second, the enormous amount of statistical data necessary to 
launch a federal suit by the Justice Department limits the number of 
claims which may be brought, even though the problem of mortgage 
discrimination is pervasive. While summarizing the lessons learned by 
the Department of Justice during the Decatur Federal case, Attorney 
General Reno stated, "statistical methods can reveal whether institu-
tions that reject minority applicants at higher rates than white appli-
cants have discriminated on a prohibited basis .... While it [statistical 
analysis] can be expensive and often require an analysis of large num-
bers of files, its power of persuasion in the courtroom cannot be 
should dispel any argument that patterns of lending are not an indication of lending discrimi-
nation ... [t]his is a wake-up call to every banker in the country." Id. 
215 Brown, supra note 80, at 48. 
216 Kenneth Cline, Decatur to Pay $1 Million in CRA Case, AM. BANKER, Sept. 18, 1992, at 14. 
217In the Decatur Federal case, this pattern was established after the federal probe found 
forty-eight examples of mortgage discrimination. Id. 
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denied. "218 Administrative costs and time greatly limit the number of 
federal claims which may be brought by the Justice Department. The 
Decatur Federal case was only initiated after federal officials investigated 
mortgage lending practices in Atlanta for three years. Although the 
persuasive power of statistical evidence is considerable, there is no 
indication that the costs and manpower expended would have pro-
vided the Justice Department with a victory against Decatur in federal 
court. 
Finally, it should be noted that the settlement agreement reached 
by Decatur Federal Savings and Loan and the Justice Department 
prohibited the establishment of precedent which may have been cre-
ated if the case had been tried. The Decatur Federal settlement does 
not provide any guidance to private litigants who wish to file a suit in 
federal court against a discriminatory lender. In addition, the settle-
ment precludes private litigants from determining whether statistical 
data, compiled during the federal probe, would be sufficient to show 
that "race was a motivating consideration in the [defendants'] deci-
sion" not to make the loan.219 
The actual monetary terms of the Decatur Federal settlement are 
also limited in their enforcement function. While the $1 million set-
tlement appears substantial, its actual impact upon Decatur Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, a financial institution engaged in dis-
criminatory lending practices, is minimal. Decatur Federal has assets 
in the amount of $2.7 billion.220 In addition, Decatur Federal asserted 
that the settlement would not affect its proposed merger with Char-
lotte-based First Union Corporation or the price its shareholders had 
expected to receive from the transaction.221 More importantly, Decatur 
Federal's parent corporation DFSoutheastern Inc., whose common 
stock is traded on the NASDAQ market, actually noted a stock increase 
of 75 cents to $29.50 a share, on news of the settlement.222 
Mter considering Decatur Federal's substantial assets, unaffected 
merger deal, and the stability of its parent corporation's stock, the 
Justice Department's assertions that the Decatur Federal case represents 
a ''wake-up'' call to discriminating mortgage lenders appears preten-
tious. Decatur Federal's $1 million "slap on the wrist" would not seem 
to deter many large mortgage lenders from continuing their lending 
218 Reno & Fair Lending Enforcement, supra note 197, at 1. 
219 See Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1338-39 (N.D. 
Ind. 1987). 
22oCIine, supra note 216, at 14. 
221Id. First Union agreed, in April, to buy Decatur Federal for $143 million in stock. 
222Id. 
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practices if they appear discriminatory. Upon reviewing the Decatur 
Federal settlement, Craig Taylor, executive director of Power in Atlanta, 
a community advocacy group, stated, "I'm glad to see this [Decatur 
settlement], but I wish the settlement would have been more costly to 
them. When you compare it to the cost of disinvestment in the black 
community, it's a drop in the bucket."223 The $1 million settlement 
pales as a substantial compensation for the forty-eight applicants who 
were denied an opportunity to own a home, develop their families, and 
nurture neighborhood friendships due to the color of their skin. Dis-
crimination, in any form, disrupts the very moral fabric of this country. 
It is deplorable that the Justice Department's settlement in the Decatur 
Federal case could not disrupt the day-to-day business of a mortgage 
lender who has participated in a pattern of blatant discrimination. 
B. The Shawmut Settlement 
Mter the Decatur settlement, the Justice Department, as a result 
of the Boston Study, began to focus its attention on discriminatory 
mortgage lenders in the Boston area.224 One such lender, the Hartford, 
Connecticut based Shawmut National Corporation, found its lending 
practices under fire by the Federal Reserve Board and the Department 
ofJustice.225 Before a federal suit could be launched, Shawmut reached 
a settlement with the Department ofJustice.226 
In December of 1993, Shawmut agreed to provide an initial com-
pensation fund of $960,000 for minority applicants who were denied 
loans on the basis of race from 1990 to 1992.227 Due to the corrective 
action Shawmut had begun to take on its own, the settlement included 
compensatory, rather than punitive, damages.228 Like the Decatur Fed-
eral agreement, the Shawmut settlement was reached after the Depart-
ment of Justice threatened to file a federal suit after a survey revealed 
a pattern of discriminatory lending by the targeted bank. U nfortu-
223 King, supra note 203, at F1. 
224 See Enf(ffcement Chief Looking Closely at Lending Practices, (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 
14, 1993), available in LEXlS, Nexis Library, Current File (live interview with Joel Alvord, 
Shawmut Chairman and CEO, and Paul Hancock, Chief of Housing and Civil Enforcement at 
the Department of Justice) [hereinafter Enf(ffcement ChiefJ. 
225 See News Conference Concerning M(fftgage Discrimination, Fed. News Service 1 (Dec. 13, 
1993). 
226 Bias Police Will Watch M(fftgage Banks, 3 THE THRIFT REGULATOR 6,6 (1993). 
227 News Conference Concerning M(fftgage Discrimination, supra note 225, at 1. Under the 
consent decree approved by the federal court, each applicant rejected due to race would receive 
at least $10,000. Id. In addition to the monetary settlement, regulators blocked Shawmut's 
acquisition of another New England Bank. Enf(ffcement Chief, supra note 224. 
228 News Conference Concerning M(fftgage Discrimination, supra note 225, at 1. 
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nately, the Shawmut settlement shares the enforcement shortcomings 
of Decatur Federal 
The settlement agreement reached between the Department of 
Justice and Shawmut Bank has two significant flaws: (1) the Justice 
Department's emphasis on self-imposed corrective action provides banks 
with an opportunity to mitigate potential damages, rather than elimi-
nate lending discrimination, and (2) the Justice Department seemingly 
can only invoke its enforcement power after an extensive pattern of 
mortgage lending discrimination has been established by a study or 
survey. 
In a news conference concerning mortgage discrimination, Attor-
ney General Reno emphasized the importance of the "remedial actions 
taken by Shawmut long before the Justice Department came onto the 
scene .... "229 Due to Shawmut's remedial actions, the settlement agree-
ment did not include punitive damages.23o While the Justice Depart-
ment asserts that Shawmut can serve "as a guidance to the lending 
industry, "231 the Shawmut settlement could also send a message to 
lenders that self-imposed regulatory measures will protect those lend-
ers from punitive damages, imposed by the Justice Department. There-
fore, mortgage lenders would focus on establishing self-imposed regu-
latory safeguards which might draw approval from the Department of 
Justice, rather than ensuring that these self-imposed regulatory safe-
guards actually help eliminate racial factors from the mortgage deci-
sion-making process. 
As with the Decatur Federal case, the Department of Justice only 
instituted this settlement agreement after a clear and substantial pat-
tern of mortgage discrimination was found. The enormous cost and 
time necessary to compile a survey like the Boston Study hinders the 
number of cases which may be brought by the Justice Department. As 
with Decatur Federa~ the Shawmut settlement does not provide a pre-
cedential framework by which private litigants can determine what 
evidence is necessary to show that "race was a motivating consideration 
in the [defendant's] decision" not to make the loan.232 
229Id. 
230Id. These self-imposed remedial measures include: the conduction of formal reviews of 
its rejected minority applicants, teaching front line employees how to ensure that every applicant 
is given full and fair consideration, and the institution of random tests to determine whether its 
loan officers are discouraging minority applicants from applying for loans. Id. 
231Id. 
232 See Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1338 (N.D. Ind. 
1987). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act studies, coupled with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston survey, provide overwhelming statisti-
cal proof that minorities are denied home mortgages more frequently 
than whites because of their race. Even with firm evidence of discrimi-
natory lending, the nation's federal agencies have not been effective 
in regulating and eliminating racially biased mortgage lending prac-
tices. The Community Reinvestment and Fair Housing Acts do not 
provide viable causes of action under which private applicants may seek 
relief. Only the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its use in Decatur 
Federal and Shawmut offer hope for minorities who seek relief in the 
federal courts against financial institutions which practice discrimina-
tion in their mortgage lending. Without legislative amendments calling 
for more regulatory intervention through the Community Reinvest-
ment and Fair Housing Acts and continued suits by the Justice Depart-
ment under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, it is apparent that the 
documented discriminatory lending practices of the nation's banks will 
go unpunished. 

